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Abstract
This paper studies the attitude of non-professional investors towards financial
losses and their decisions concerning wealth allocation among consumption, risky,
and risk-free financial assets. We employ a two-dimensional utility setting in which
both consumption and financial wealth fluctuations generate utility. The perception
of financial wealth is modelled in an extended prospect-theory framework that ac-
counts for both the distinction between gains and losses with respect to a subjective
reference point and the impact of past performance on the current perception of
the risky portfolio value. The decision problem is addressed in two distinct equilib-
rium settings in the aggregate market with a representative investor, namely with
expected and non-expected utility. Empirical estimations performed on the basis of
real market data and for various parameter configurations show that both settings
similarly describe the attitude towards financial losses. Yet, the recommendations
regarding wealth allocation are different. Maximizing expected utility results on
average in low total-wealth percentages dedicated to consumption, but supports
myopic loss aversion. Non-expected utility yields more reasonable assignments to
consumption but also a high preference for risky assets. In this latter setting, my-
opic loss aversion holds solely when financial wealth fluctuations are viewed as the
main utility source and in very soft form.
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1 Introduction
Optimal allocation of resources among different activities that generate utility represents
a main decision problem in everyday life. For each individuum, the first and most im-
portant source of individual utility is consumption. Additionally, people who are active
in financial markets derive utility from their investments. This paper addresses the atti-
tude towards financial losses of individual (non-professional) investors who narrowly frame
risky investments and change current perceptions subject to the past performance of these
investments. Equally, we analyze how (non-professional) investors split their money be-
tween consumption and (risky and risk-free) financial projects as a consequence of their
loss attitude.
Our work is based on the theoretical framework introduced in Barberis, Huang, and
Santos (2001) and developed in Barberis, Huang, et al. (2003, 2004). Several ideas
developed in these papers have already been incorporated by Rengifo and Trifan (2006)
into the portfolio optimization setting developed in Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk
(2001). In particular, Rengifo and Trifan (2006) describe how individual perceptions of
risky financial investments impact on the optimal composition of a risky portfolio and the
money to be invested in risk-free assets. Their focus lies thus on capital allocation decisions
of non-professional investors, where finding the optimal mix of risky assets is assumed
to represent the task of professional portfolio managers. Meanwhile, non-professional
investors are left with the choice between the risky portfolio as a whole and a risk-free
asset. In this context, individual utility is considered to exclusively originate in financial
wealth fluctuations. Thus, the designed utility setting in Rengifo and Trifan (2006) can
be regarded as one-sided.
The present paper aims at enlarging this perspective to what we denote as two-
dimensional utility. Specifically, our setting accounts for consumption as additional source
of utility besides the utility derived from financial investments. Our non-professional in-
vestors have now to decide upon the optimal wealth allocation between consumption and
financial investments in general, where the latter category offers a further choice between
the risky portfolio and a risk-free asset. We adopt the formal views in Rengifo and Tri-
fan (2006) regarding the subjectively perceived value of risky investments (denoted as the
prospective value) and how it enters the decision problem of non-professional investors. In
addition, we rely on two theoretical approaches proposed in Barberis and Huang (2004a,b),
according to which investors decisions rely on the maximization of either expected utility
or of recursive non-expected utility with first-order risk aversion. In both cases, the utility
function is shaped in order to account for the narrow framing of financial investments and
for the influence of past portfolio performance on current perceptions of risky investments.
Moreover, for a better description of the individual attitude towards financial losses, two
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further measures used in Rengifo and Trifan (2006) are adopted, namely the loss aversion
index (LAi) and the global first-order risk aversion (gRA).
In order to analyze the loss attitude and the wealth allocation in this context, we
proceed in line with Barberis and Huang (2004a,b). Thus, we first derive necessary and
sufficient equilibrium conditions on the aggregate market with a representative investor.
Second, fixing general market parameters (such as the dynamics of consumption and
of expected returns), these conditions serve to derive the equilibrium expressions of the
variables of interest. These variables are either common to both considered approaches
with expected and non-expected utility (such as the prospective value, the loss aver-
sion coefficient, and further measures of the attitude towards losses) or specific (such as
the time-discounting factor of the utility function in the expected-utility setting, or the
percentages of total wealth dedicated to consumption and of post-consumption wealth
invested in risky assets in the non-expected utility setting).
In the sequel, the theoretical part developed so far is empirically implemented and
amended. To this end, we rely on the same data set as in Rengifo and Trifan (2006),
consisting of the SP500 and the 10-year bond nominal returns, as proxies for a well
diversified risky portfolio and the risk-free investment, respectively. In addition, we employ
aggregate per-capita consumption data that allow us to analyze the investor loss attitude
and the decisions concerning the wealth allocation for two different evaluation frequencies
of the risky-portfolio performance (of one year and three months). We simulate how non-
professional investors who follow the logic of our model make decisions in an environment
where consumption and financial markets are characterized by general parameters derived
from the sets of real data at hand. In so doing, we consider various configurations of
the individual (behavioral) parameters (such as the consumption-based risk aversion, the
narrow-framing degree, the penalties imposed on past financial losses, and the initial
coefficient of loss aversion). Moreover, we attempt to avoid the impossibility of covering
current consumption needs from financial revenues over the entire investing interval, by
considering that investors periodically dispose of exogenous additional incomes. In order
to investigate the sensitivity of our model to this assumption, we further consider different
levels of the additional income that are further shaped to render comparable the two
approaches with expected and non-expected utility.
In both considered utility settings, we estimate the prospective values ascribed to
risky investments and derive the corresponding loss aversion coefficients in equilibrium.
These estimates also serve to compute the equilibrium values of the extended measures
of individual attitude to financial risk, namely the loss aversion index and the global
first-order risk aversion. In addition, the discounting factor of the utility function is
additionally estimated from the equilibrium conditions in the expected-utility setting.
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Here, the wealth percentages dedicated to consumption, risky, and riskless assets can
be assessed on average only. By contrast, the non-expected utility approach delivers
direct estimates of the proportions of total wealth allocated to consumption and of post-
consumption wealth invested in risky assets.
The empirical findings can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, maximizing
expected or non-expected utility derived from consumption and narrowly framed finan-
cial investments, generates similar attitudes towards financial losses. In particular, the
loss aversion coefficient in equilibrium lies close to the “neutral” value of 1, which shows
that investors who derive utility from twofold source are more relaxed towards financial
losses than suggested by the original prospect theory (that proposes the value of 2.25 for
the same coefficient). Moreover, the same coefficient increases for either higher degrees
of narrow framing, or when no penalties are imposed on past losses, other things being
equal. Mostly, it also decreases c.p. as the risky performance is more frequently evaluated,
but the direction of this variation is more sensitive with respect to the magnitude of the
additional income in the non-expected utility setting. In addition, the loss aversion index
in equilibrium follows closely in value and the evolution pattern of the simple loss aversion
coefficient. The global first-order risk aversion exhibits similar development and appears
to more consistently describe the actual investor attitude towards financial losses. More-
over, both approaches entail negative estimates of the prospective value in equilibrium,
suggesting that financial investments decrease the overall utility. A final common finding
refers to the fact that both an excessive consumption-related risk aversion and the lack of
narrow framing of financial investments entail implausible equilibrium-estimates.
On the other hand, the two approaches provide different recommendations regarding
the wealth allocation between consumption and (risky and riskless) financial assets. Note
that in both settings, this allocation substantially varies with the magnitude of the ad-
ditional income. Investors who maximize expected utility appear to be on average very
open to financial investments, as they consume only small fractions of their total wealth
(less than one-fifth). The myopic loss aversion holds in this setting, as the total-wealth
percentages invested in risky assets diminish to almost one-third when the risky perfor-
mance is evaluated every three-months instead of once a year. By contrast, reaching the
aggregate equilibrium with non-expected utility requires more reasonable wealth percent-
ages dedicated to consumption (namely over one-third). In exchange, investors are now
very open to risky investments and even borrow money to increase the value of their
risky portfolios. The resulting parts of total wealth that flow into risky investments are
substantially higher but also more variable subject to the magnitude of the additional
income, relative to the expected-utility setting. Finally, myopic loss aversion holds under
the maximization of non-expected utility only when investors regard narrowly framed fi-
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nancial investments as a more important source of utility relative to consumption. Even
in such situations the sums allocated to risky assets are only minimally reduced as their
performance is revised more often.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical framework is
presented in Section 2. In this context, Section 2.1 provides a brief review of the general
purpose of the model in Rengifo and Trifan (2006) and refreshes the definitions of variables
of interest for the present paper. The extension of this model to the two-dimensional utility
setting is undertaken in Section 2.2, which details the approaches with expected and non-
expected utility. Section 3 presents the empirical implementation of our theoretical model
for the expected-utility framework in Section 3.2, and the non-expected utility setting in
Section 3.3. The main findings under these two theoretical approaches are confronted in
the subsequent Section 3.4. Finally, Section 4 summarizes our findings. Further numerical
results are included in the Appendix.
2 Theoretical model
This section presents the theoretical framework describing how non-professional investors
perceive financial risks and accordingly allocate their wealth between consumption and
financial investments in order to maximize perceived utility. In line with Barberis and
Huang (2004a,b), we adopt two distinct formulations of the maximization problem, first
around expected utility and, second, around recursive non-expected utility with first-order
risk aversion. Both settings account for narrow framing of financial projects and for the
influence of past performance on the perceived prospective value of risky investments.
2.1 A one-dimensional utility framework
One of the most important decisions in everyday life is how to allocate money among
different type of activities. These activities may be either necessary and/or can generate
further revenues. In the latter category, investing in financial assets has nowadays become
one of the most popular alternatives. This widespread trend of ordinary people turning
into “investors” is due at least in part to the formidable accessibility of information con-
cerning financial markets, at almost no cost and in almost no time. Under the pressure of
the huge amount and intensity of such information, even non-professional investors may
have no choice but to become overly concerned with their financial investments. This
phenomenon of putting excessive emphasis on financial investments is denoted in tech-
nical terms as “narrow framing”. Under narrow framing, allocating the “right” amount
of money first to financial investments in general, then across different financial assets,
turns into a central decision. Also, financial investments are perceived as distinct and
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overly important generators of individual utility. This dissociates the decisions upon
wealth allocation from the naturally larger context with multiple utility generators (such
as consumption or other factors that do not exclusively apply to financial markets).
Drawing on this idea, Rengifo and Trifan (2006) model the attitude towards financial
risks and the decision making of non-professional investors regarding the optimal wealth
allocation among different financial assets. In so doing, they assume that investors derive
utility merely from financial investments. Their theoretical analysis develops in the port-
folio optimization framework suggested in Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001), where
market risk is measured by the Value-at-Risk (VaR) and enters the optimization problem
in form of a specific constraint. In particular, individual non-professional investors fix in
a first step their desired VaR-levels (denoted VaR*) according to their subjective prefer-
ences and perceptions. The choice of VaR* takes place outside of the risky portfolio so
to speak, in the sense that it precedes and hence it is not influenced by its composition.
The individually chosen VaR* is then communicated to professional portfolio managers.
They are in charge of the optimal money allocation among risky assets, in other words
of decisions inside of the risky portfolio. In a second step, considering the given VaR*,
portfolio managers determine the optimal composition of the risky portfolio and implicitly
the sum to be invested in risk-free assets. In so doing, professional managers help their
non-professional clients to solve the problem of optimally allocating money between risky
and risk-free assets.
The present work builds on the model in Rengifo and Trifan (2006) and extends it
for the case when investors derive utility not only from financial investments, but also
from consumption. Before entering into the details of this extended framework, we briefly
review the main model structure and the notions defined and applied in Rengifo and
Trifan (2006).
In order to quantify the formation of the desired VaR*-level in investor minds, Rengifo
and Trifan (2006) adopt the extended prospect theory framework developed in Bar-
beris, Huang, and Santos (2001). This framework models individual perceptions of risky
projects. Accordingly, the subjective perception of one unit of risky investment is cap-
tured by an extended value function vt+1. As in the original prospect theory of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979, 1992), this value function accounts for the distinct perception of gains
and losses with respect to a subjective reference point and the higher reluctance to losses.
In addition, it is designed to capture the possible influence of past performance on the
current risk perception. We apply the definitions of the value function proposed in Section
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2.2 of Rengifo and Trifan (2006), namely:
vt+1 =

St(Rt+1 −Rft) , for Rt+1 ≥ RftλSt(Rt+1 −Rft) + (λ− 1)(St − Zt)Rft , for Rt+1 < Rft , for zt ≤ 1 (1)
and
vt+1 =

St(Rt+1 −Rft) , for Rt+1 ≥ RftλSt(Rt+1 −Rft) + k(Zt − St)(Rt+1 −Rft) , for Rt+1 < Rft , for zt > 1, (2)
where k > 0 represents the sensitivity to past losses and λ > 0 the individual loss aversion
coefficient (with λ ≥ 1 indicating loss aversion in strict sense). Moreover, Rt+1 stands
for the next-period portfolio returns and Rft for the risk-free returns. Finally, St denotes
the current value of the risky investment, while Zt is a benchmark level for past portfolio
performance, so that St−Zt accounts for the so-called cushion of past gains and/or losses
generated by the risky portfolio.
Denoting the equity premium by xt+1 = Rt+1−Rft and the probability of experiencing
past gains by πt = P (Zt ≤ St), Equations (1) and (2) can be pooled to a single expression
that accounts for both cases with prior gains (zt ≤ 1) and prior losses (zt > 1), namely:
vt+1 =

Stxt+1 , for xt+1 ≥ 0[λSt − (1− πt)k(St − Zt)]xt+1 + πt(λ− 1)Rft(St − Zt) , for xt+1 < 0,
On the basis of the perception of financial investments captured in the value functions
from Equations (1) and (2), Rengifo and Trifan (2006) define the maximum risk level
desired (accepted) by individual (non-professional) investors VaR* as:
VaR∗t+1 = λStEt[xt+1]
+ [(πt − ϕ
√
πt(1− πt))(λ− 1)Rft − (1− πt + ϕ
√
πt(1− πt))kEt[xt+1]](St − Zt),
(3)
where Et[xt+1] = Et[Rt+1]−Rft represents the expected equity premium.
As mentioned above, once this VaR* has formed in investor minds it is communicated
to the portfolio manager in the form of a fixed (so to speak “portfolio-exogenous”) risk
level. It hence flows into the problem of optimization inside the risky portfolio as risk
constraint. According to Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001), finding the optimal
capital allocation implies the derivation of the optimal investment in risk-free assets. This
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is referred as the optimal amount of money to be borrowed or lent and yields:
Bt =
VaR∗ +VaR
Rft − qt(w∗t , α)
, (4)
where Bt > 0 (Bt < 0) stands for borrowing (lending), VaR=Wt[qt(w
∗
t , α)− 1] represents
the so-called portfolio Value-at-Risk, w∗t the optimal portfolio weights, and qt(wt, α) the
quantile of the distribution of portfolio returns at a given confidence level α.
Central to the analysis conducted in Rengifo and Trifan (2006), on which the present
work is based, is the derivation of the so-called prospective value Vt+1. This variable
captures the subjectively perceived utility of the risky portfolio, which non-professional
investors aim at maximizing.1 According to Equation (2.23) in Rengifo and Trifan (2006),
the prospective value can be formally defined as:
Vt+1 = [ωt+(1−ωt)λ]StEt[xt+1]+ (1−ωt)[πt(λ−1)Rft− (1−πt)kEt[xt+1]](St−Zt), (5)
where ωt = P (Et[Rt+1] ≥ Rft) is the probability of having a positive expected equity
premium Et[xt+1] ≥ 0. Moreover, Rengifo and Trifan (2006) distinguish in Equation
(5) between the PT-effect and the cushion effect. The former refers to the first term
on the right-hand side and stems from the value function formulation in the original
prospect theory. The latter effect denotes the second term on the right-hand side of
Equation (5) and has as its source the prior gains and losses accumulated from trading
the risky portfolio. The present work aims at determining the prospective value ascribed
by the representative investor who derives utility from both consumption and financial
investments in the market equilibrium.
From the prospective value in equilibrium, we subsequently determine the equivalent
coefficient of loss aversion λt+1. Formally, this yields:
λt+1 =
Vt+1 − ωtStEt[xt+1] + (1− ωt){πtRft + (1− πt)kEt[xt+1]}(St − Zt)
(1− ωt){StEt[xt+1] + πtRft(St − Zt)}
. (6)
This coefficient plays a central role in our model, as it represents a measure of the attitude
towards financial losses and previous research suggests concrete values for it (such as 2.25
in the prospect theory).
As Rengifo and Trifan (2006) note, the joint impact of the loss aversion coefficient λ
and of past negative performance k changes the actual investor aversion to financial losses.
1Note that the term “maximization” shall be understood here in a general, lax sense (rather as
“optimization”). In essence, the non-professional investors in Rengifo and Trifan (2006) are considered
rather unsophisticated, and hence do not have to tackle any maximization problem in strict mathematical
sense. Yet, these investors (as every person) attempt to perform most useful actions, given real constraints
(such as their individual loss aversion, the past performance of their risky portfolios, etc.). Recall also
that utility is assumed to exclusively emanate from investment decisions.
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Further measures then appear necessary to capture additional and more realistic aspects
of this loss attitude. The first of them applied in Rengifo and Trifan (2006) is the index
of loss aversion (shortly LAi). Introduced in Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005), this index
represents the ratio of the left and right derivatives of the value function at the reference
point:
λ˜t =
λSt − (1− πt)k(St − Zt)
St
= λ− (1− πt)k(1− zt). (7)
Second, as loss aversion stands for risk aversion of first order in the loss domain, Rengifo
and Trifan (2006) introduce the notion of global first-order risk aversion (shortly gRA).
It is defined as the first derivative of the prospective value with respect to the expected
equity premium, namely:
Λt =
∂Vt+1
∂Et[xt+1]
= [ωt+(1−ωt)λ]St− (1−ωt)(1−πt)k(St−Zt) = St[ωt+(1−ωt)λ˜t]. (8)
It is important to note that LAi is to be interpreted analogously to the simple coefficient
of loss aversion, namely that increasing values are equivalent with an enhanced aversion
towards financial losses. By contrast, higher gRA-values denote a more relaxed loss at-
titude.2 In the empirical part of the present work, we analyze the evolution of LAi and
gRA in our extended equilibrium framework with two-dimensional utility.
2.2 A two-dimensional utility framework
As noted in Section 2.1, Rengifo and Trifan (2006) consider that investors are merely
concerned with financial investments and the utility they generate. Specifically, investors
exclusively aim at the maximization of the subjectively perceived next-period value of
their financial investments. In practice, such considerations appear to be better suited
to professional than to non-professional investors. The activity of the former demands a
strictly investment-oriented perspective, and their main task reduces to making money
that is going to be reinvested in financial markets. By contrast, non-professional in-
vestors sooner regard financial investments as a source of income dedicated to covering
consumption needs.3 In other words, for non-professional investors consumption should
be the main generator of individual utility. Yet, as financial investments are usually risky
and non-professional investors risk averse, the attention payed to financial results may be
excessive. As already mentioned, this phenomenon is denoted as narrow framing and is
driven by the fear of registering losses when facing financial risks. Narrow framing renders
2According to Equation (8), gRA directly reflects the changes in the prospective value V . Recall that
the latter is proportional to the attractiveness of financial investments.
3Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001) note on p. 1800 that the simple VaR-framework without
consumption is sufficiently informative for describing decision making of (non-professional) investors under
risk.
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the importance of financial investments as source of utility comparable to the relevance
of consumption.
Based on these considerations, our work extends the setting in Rengifo and Trifan
(2006) by allowing for two sources of individual utility, namely financial wealth fluctuations
and consumption. The present section details the theoretical background of this original
contribution.
In effect, the wealth allocation problem of non-professional investors tackled in the
one-dimensional utility framework of Rengifo and Trifan (2006) is now augmented with
an extra step. This consists of splitting money between consumption and financial invest-
ments. Strictly speaking, this step should be placed on a time axis before the decision
about how much money to invest in different types of financial assets. The reason is that
nobody can decide upon partitioning a certain sum among risky and riskless assets, with-
out having already determined how much money has to be assigned to financial projects
in total (i.e. after consumption). However, given that the performance of risky invest-
ments is measured in general (and in our approach in particular) with respect to risk-free
assets,4 we can formally merge these steps into a single decision issue. The common goal
is then the maximization of total utility derived from consumption and risky (relative to
risk-free) financial investments.
Following Barberis and Huang (2004b), we consider an aggregate market which lacks
perfect substitution, hence we can focus on absolute pricing and avoid possible arbitrage
opportunities generated by narrow framing. In this setting, the total utility is formulated
in order to account for the above-mentioned twofold origin. Thus, we denote the utility
derived from consumption by U(C) and the one from financial wealth changes by V˜t+1.
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Accordingly, the total utility represents a sum of discounted utilities of consumption and
of perceived values of financial investments:6
U = U(C) + V˜ =
∞∑
t=0
[ρtU(Ct) + ρ
t+1btV˜t+1], (9)
where ρ < 1 stands for the discounting factor.
According to the above Equation (9), the current consumption is discounted with ρt,
while the prospective value needs to be discounted with ρt+1 as it encompasses subjective
perception of the the next-period performance.7 In line with Barberis, Huang, and Santos
4Recall that the reference point of the perceived value of the risky prospect in Definitions (1) and (2)
is Rft.
5Strictly speaking, V˜t+1 corresponds to the prospective value Vt+1 as defined in Equation (5), before
taking expectations, as in our framework the prospective value is generated by the value function weighted
by pure probabilities hence reduces to an expected value.
6In the empirical part, we consider a finite investment duration T that is however sufficiently long in
order to allow for reaching an equilibrium.
7Recall that the prospective value encompasses the future return Rt+1.
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(2001), bt represents an exogenous scaling factor designed to map the perceived value
of gains and losses into consumption units. In our model, it follows the rule stated in
their Equation (11): bt = b0C¯
−γ
t , where C¯t represents the exogenous
8 aggregate per-capita
consumption at time t and b0 measures the degree of narrow framing. Finally, γ is the
consumption-related coefficient of risk aversion.
In line with Barberis and Huang (2004a), it is now possible to develop an equilibrium
framework in the aggregate market with a representative investor.9 We derive the equi-
librium conditions in two different settings, first when this investor maximizes expected
utility, and second when a recursive non-expected utility function with first-order risk
aversion is optimized. Throughout, we formally incorporate the assumptions of narrow
framing and dependence of current decisions on past portfolio performance.
2.2.1 The expected-utility approach
First, we consider the approach adopted in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), where
the representative investor aims at maximizing total expected utility generated by both
consumption and financial wealth changes.10 We refer to the utility of consumption in
traditional CRRA-terms, namely U(Ct) =
C1−γt
1− γ
. The utility of financial investments is
measured by the prospective value in Equation (5). Thus, the maximization problem in
the above Equation (9) yields:
Et[U ] = Et
[
∞∑
i=0
(
ρi
C1−γi
1− γ
+ b0ρ
i+1C¯−γi v(Gi+1)
)]
−→
Ct,θt
max., (10)
where v is the value function from Equations (1) and (2) and
Gt+1 = θt(Wt − Ct)(Rt+1 −Rft) (11)
represents the change in value of the risky investment. Moreover, Wt stands here for
the total wealth and θt for the fraction of post-consumption wealth allocated to the risky
portfolio.
The following equations provide for the formal compatibility of the one-dimensional
utility framework in Rengifo and Trifan (2006) and the current two-dimensional utility
framework. Specifically, the post-consumption wealth proportion put in risky assets θt,
8The exogeneity refers here to the subjective viewpoint of the individual investor. It points out the
fact that bt is independent of every individual feature related to risk or loss aversion.
9Henceforth, we use the denominations of “representative investor” and “investors” interchangeably,
where the latter represent a group with homogenous preferences. In essence, the actions of all investors
in equilibrium can be summarized by the corresponding choices of the representative investor.
10As demonstrated in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), this framework can explain the emergence
of equity premiums of the magnitude observed in practice.
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the current value of the risky investment St, as well as the amount of money borrowed
(Bt > 0) or lent (Bt < 0) are reformulated in order to correspond to the total wealth Wt,
that now also comprises consumption and yield:
θt =
Wt − Ct +Bt
Wt − Ct
(12a)
St = θt(Wt − Ct) (12b)
Bt = (Wt − Ct)
VaR∗ +VaR
(Wt − Ct)Rft − VaR
. (12c)
Note that the post-consumption wealth fraction allocated to risk-free assets becomes
1 − θt = −Bt/(Wt − Ct). Also, the next period total results from the current financial
investment and can be expressed as:11
Wt+1 = (Wt − Ct)[θtRt+1 + (1− θt)Rft]. (13)
Noting that the maximization in Equation (10) is carried out for both consumption Ct
and the wealth fraction invested in risky assets θt (hence the value of the risky investment
St), the corresponding Euler equations for optimality at equilibrium yield:
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ρRfE
[(
C¯t+1
C¯t
)
−γ
]
= 1 (14a)
ρE
[
Rt+1
(
C¯t+1
C¯t
)
−γ
]
+ b0ρC¯
−γ
t E[v¯(Gt+1)] = 1. (14b)
Moreover, E[v¯(Gt+1)] is identical to the prospective value at equilibrium that we denote
by V¯ . Our goal is to then provide an empirical value for V¯ according to Equation (6) for
the loss aversion parameter λ of the representative investor in equilibrium.
In order to perform the estimation of V¯ , additional assumptions concerning the con-
sumption and return dynamics are needed. In line with Barberis and Huang (2004a),
Equations (68)-(70), we take:13
11A part Ct+1/Wt+1 is subsequently allocated to consumption, but consumption generates merely
utility and not wealth.
12See Equation (27), (28) from Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001).
13Note that Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) assume that returns develop following the dividends
payed by the risky asset Rt+1 = (Pt+1 + Dt+1)/Pt. If this can be considered as a sound assumption
on an annual basis, an annoying problem emerges in terms of higher portfolio evaluation frequencies.
While prices vary daily, dividends are released only once every three months or even at longer time
intervals. (For instance, according to data from finance.yahoo.com, the mean frequency of dividends
releases amounts to approximatively 4.5 months.) This generates a non-smooth dividend evolution that
accounts on one hand for the dates of dividend release (when dividends truly change in value) and, on
the other hand, for the in-between periods (when no dividends are distributed to investors, meaning they
13
log
(
Ct+1
Ct
)
= c+ σcǫt+1 (15a)
log(Rt+1) = r + σrηt+1 (15b)(
ǫt+1
ηt+1
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
1 σcr
σcr 1
))
, i.i.d. over time. (15c)
Thus, for a constant risk-free rate Rf the equilibrium Equations (14) entail:
14
exp
(
−γc+
γ2σ2c
2
)
=
1
ρRf
(16a)
exp
(
−γc+ r +
γ2σ2c + σ
2
r
2
− γσcr
)
+ b0C¯
−γ
t V¯ =
1
ρ
. (16b)
2.2.2 The non-expected utility approach
Although the expected-utility maximization represents the most widespread theoretical
approach so far, Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2003) claim there is another specifica-
tion that best captures the utility of decisions under risk. In particular, this is a non-
expected recursive utility with first-order risk aversion (R-FORA). Yet, simple R-FORA
specifications account merely for loss aversion and hence need to be extended in order
to accommodate with both narrow framing and loss aversion. These phenomena appear
to be crucial for explaining several stock market puzzles and constitute the core of our
approach. Henceforth we refer to the R-FORA setting with narrow framing as the non-
expected utility approach.
We rely on the approach proposed in Barberis and Huang (2004a) according to which
investors maximize a recursive utility-function Ut, that is defined as:
Ut = ⋄〈Ct, µ(Ut+1 + b0Et[v(Gt+1)]|It)〉, (17)
can be considered as constant from one trade to the other). Formally, between two successive dividend
releasing times (u, u+ 1], we have:
Dt+1 =
{
Du, for t ∈ (u, u+ 1)
Du+1, for t = u+ 1,
hence
Dt+1
Dt
=


1, for t ∈ (u, u+ 1)
Du+1
Du
, for t = u+ 1.
14Here we used the fact that, for x ∼ N(µ, σ2), E[exp(x)] = exp(µ + σ2/2). Also, for xi ∼ N(µi, σ
2
i ),
where i = 1, 2 i.i.d. over time and with covariance σ12, E[exp(x1+x2)] = exp(µ1+µ2+(σ
2
1+σ
2
2)/2+σ12).
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where
⋄ 〈C, x〉 = [(1− β)C1−γ + βx1−γ ]
1
1−γ , for 0 < β < 1, 0 < γ 6= 1 (18a)
µ(x) = (E[x1−γ ])
1
1−γ , for 0 < γ 6= 1 (18b)
Gt+1 = θt(Wt − Ct)(Rt+1 −Rft) (18c)
v(x) =

x, for x ≥ 0λx, for x < 0 , for λ > 1. (18d)
Here, ⋄(., .) is an aggregator function and µ the homogenous certainty equivalent of the
distribution of future utility conditional on the information It at time t, the next-period
value of the risky investment Gt+1, and the individual value function v.
We restrict our analysis to the general equilibrium for aggregate markets (with a
representative investor), in line with Equations (60)-(62) and the subsequent Example
6.1 for the stock market in Barberis and Huang (2004b). Our focus remains on non-
professional investors’ decisions concerning the wealth allocation among consumption,
the risky portfolio returning Rt, and the risk-free asset with the gross return Rft. When
a fraction θt of post-consumption wealth is invested in the risky portfolio and another
fraction, now of the total wealth, αt = Ct/Wt is consumed, the following (Euler) equations
yield necessary and sufficient conditions at equilibrium:
βRftEt
[(
C¯t+1
C¯t
)
−γ
]{
βEt
[(
C¯t+1
C¯t
)
−γ
Rtott+1
]} γ
1−γ
= 1 (19a)
Et
[(
C¯t+1
C¯t
)
−γ
(Rt+1 −Rft)
]
Et
[(
C¯t+1
C¯t
)
−γ
] + b0Rft
(
β
1− β
) γ
1−γ
(
1− αt
αt
)
−
γ
1−γ
Et[v(Rt+1 −Rft)] = 0
(19b)
Et
[(
C¯t+1
C¯t
)
−γ
(Rtott+1 −Rft)
]
Et
[(
C¯t+1
C¯t
)
−γ
] + b0Rft
(
β
1− β
) γ
1−γ
(
1− αt
αt
)
−
γ
1−γ
θtEt[v(Rt+1 −Rft)] = 0,
(19c)
where Rtott+1 = θtRt+1 + (1 − θt)Rft is the total gross return of the combination between
risky and risk-free assets. Equation (19c) is derived from (19b) by multiplication with θt.
The next period financial wealth formulated in Equation (13) can be now rewritten as
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Wt+1 = (Wt − Ct)R
tot
t+1. Thus,
Rtott+1 =
αt
αt+1(1− αt)
Ct+1
Ct
. (20)
Assuming time constancy for the portfolio wealth fraction θ, the consumption ratio α,
and the risk-free return Rf , the total gross return results in:
Rtott+1 =
1
1− α
Ct+1
Ct
⇒ log(Rtott+1) = − log(1− α) + c+ σcǫt+1. (21)
Thus, the equilibrium Equations (19) yield:
β
1
1−γ (1− α)−
γ
1−γRfE
[(
C¯t+1
C¯t
)
−γ
]{
E
[(
C¯t+1
C¯t
)1−γ]} γ1−γ
= 1 (22a)
E
[(
C¯t+1
C¯t
)
−γ
(Rt+1 −Rf )
]
E
[(
C¯t+1
C¯t
)
−γ
] + b0Rf
(
β
1− β
) γ
1−γ
(
1− α
α
)
−
γ
1−γ
E[v¯(Rt+1 −Rf )] = 0
(22b)
E
[(
C¯t+1
C¯t
)
−γ
(Rtott+1 −Rf )
]
E
[(
C¯t+1
C¯t
)
−γ
] + b0Rf
(
β
1− β
) γ
1−γ
(
1− α
α
)
−
γ
1−γ
θE[v¯(Rt+1 −Rf )] = 0.
(22c)
We proceed similar to Section 2.2.1 by assuming the parameter dynamics of con-
sumption and returns in Equations (15). Also, we consider that the value functions
(1) and (2) are equivalent in expectation to the prospective value in Equation (5), i.e.
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V¯ = E[v¯(Rt+1 −Rf )]. Thus, the equilibrium Equations (22) can be further restated as:
β
1
1−γ (1− α)−
γ
1−γRf exp
(
γσ2c
2
)
= 1 (23a)
− exp
(
−γc+ r +
γ2σ2c + σ
2
r
2
− γσcr
)
+Rf exp
(
−γc+
γ2σ2c
2
)
= b0Rf
(
β
1− β
) γ
1−γ
(
1− α
α
)
−
γ
1−γ
exp
(
−γc+
γ2σ2c
2
)
V¯ (23b)
−
1
1− α
exp
(
(1− γ)c+
(1− γ)2σ2c
2
)
+Rf exp
(
−γc+
γ2σ2c
2
)
= b0Rf
(
β
1− β
) γ
1−γ
(
1− α
α
)
−
γ
1−γ
exp
(
−γc+
γ2σ2c
2
)
θV¯ . (23c)
3 Empirical results
This section presents empirical findings based on the theoretical framework presented in
the above Section 2.2. We start off by describing the general assumptions made in order
to facilitate the estimation procedure and to render the two settings with expected and
non-expected utility comparable. Subsequently, the estimation results are illustrated and
commented on for each of these settings, where the exposition focuses on two main aspects.
First, we address the evolution of the attitude towards financial losses as described by the
loss aversion coefficient and the extended measures LAi and gRA. Second, we examine
the optimal wealth allocation among consumption, risky, and riskless assets, as well as
the occurrence of myopic loss aversion.
3.1 General assumptions
Our estimations are based on the same data set as in Rengifo and Trifan (2006), that
includes the SP500 and the 10-year bond nominal returns (as proxies for the risky and
the risk-free investment, respectively) from 01/02/1962 to 03/09/2006 (11,005 daily ob-
servations). This data is divided into two parts, from which only the second one (from
03/01/1982 to 03/09/2006, specifically 6,010 observations) is considered to be the active
set (and used for performing simulations). The observations before the “date zero” of
the trade (03/01/1982) serve to estimate the empirical mean and the standard deviation
of the portfolio returns at date zero. Additionally, aggregate per-capita consumption
data between 01/02/1962 and 12/31/200515 provide a basis for the calculation of the
15This data was provided by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau
of the Census.
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log-consumption mean and variance.16 Note that this data set allows us to assess con-
sumption values corresponding to portfolio evaluations frequencies of merely one year and
three months. Thus, we cannot replicate the more detailed analysis in Rengifo and Trifan
(2006) regarding the impact of the evaluation frequency on investor decisions.
After smoothing out the outlier corresponding to the October 1987 market crash,17
quarterly and yearly returns are constructed from the active data set and used to derive
the optimal risky investment. In so doing, we assume that investors start by spreading
their wealth equally between consumption and financial assets, where the latter fraction
is further allocated equally to the risky portfolio and the bond. In addition, investors are
considered to be long-lived beyond the VaR-horizon and are not allowed to quit the market
during the trading period. Moreover, cushions are assumed to be cumulatively amassed
from past trades (starting at date zero) Zt =
t∑
i=0
Si, portfolio gross returns to be normally
distributed, and future portfolio returns to be estimated as the unconditional mean of
past returns. In addition, we assess Rˆf = mean[Rft], cˆ = mean[log(Ct+1) − log(Ct)] in
Equation (15a), and rˆ = mean[log(Rt)] in Equation (15b), where the means are computed
throughout the active period (from 03/01/1982 to 03/09/2006).
A delicate issue that might emerge from our consideration that investors are long-
lived investors and have financial investments as sole source of wealth,18 forces us to make
a final and more specific assumption. It is possible that financial investments do not
generate sufficient revenues in order to cover investors’ consumption needs over the entire
investment interval. We attempt to circumvent this potential problem19, by considering
that at each time t investors dispose of additional incomes It. Such incomes represent, for
instance, the wages earned by non-professional investors from their main employment.20
These incomes are considered as exogenous, that is, they stem from outside of those
investments that constitute the decision making object at hand. Under this assumption,
the total wealth Wt in Equation (13) results from both financial investments and the
16Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 7 in Appendix 5.1.
17This outlier is replaced with the mean of the ten before and after data points
18Recall that both consumption and financial investments generate utility, yet only the latter is “pro-
ductive” and can effectively augment wealth.
19Note that Barberis and Huang (2004a,b) avoid this problem by fixing the percentage of post-
consumption wealth invested in risky assets θ. We do not consider this as appropriate in our framework
for two reasons. First, Barberis and Huang (2004a,b) exclusively work with non-expected utility, while
our aim is to render comparable two approaches, namely those with expected and non-expected utility.
Second, our model rests on the idea that θ depends on the subjective VaR* (see Equations (12)). Hence,
imposing constancy on this parameter would eliminate the whole analyzed mechanism of how individual
perceptions of financial investments reflect in the wealth allocation.
20As their name indicates, non-professional investors mainly earn their living from other activities
(developed for example as employees of a company) than from financial investments. The latter merely
represent a secondary source of revenues.
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additional income It and yields:
Wt+1 − It+1 = (Wt − Ct)[θtRt+1 + (1− θt)Rft]. (24)
We assume that the additional income covers a part of the consumption needs of the
current period and set:21
It =
Ct
αδ
, (25)
where α represents the percentages of total wealth dedicated to consumption in the equi-
librium of the non-expected utility setting and δ > 0 is an arbitrary constant. Apparently,
for δ ≤ 1/α (δ > 1/α) the extra income exceeds (does not entirely meet) the consumption
needs of the period It ≥ Ct (It < Ct). We distinguish two particular cases with no prac-
tical meaning in the present framework. First for δ = 1, the current extra income yields
a fraction of the consumption needs It = Ct/α and investors should assign no money to
financial assets in total Rtott+1 = 0.
22 Second, for δ = 1/α the extra income that covers
exactly the current consumption It = Ct. As the total financial investment then becomes
independent of α, Rtott+1 = Ct+1/Ct, there is no further connection between investment de-
cisions and the subjective perception of financial investments in the non-expected utility
equilibrium.23 Consequently, we henceforth set δ ∈ R+ \ {0, 1, 1/α}.24
We close this section by detailing the values of the behavioral parameters that underlie
our simulations. First, we chose different values of the initial coefficient of loss aversion λ,
namely in the set {0.5; 1; 2.25; 3}. The value of 2.25 recommended by the prospect theory
is considered as the standard case and is mainly referred to in the text. Second, we consider
different values of the additional income It. As α depends on β according to Equations
(22), the choice of β and further of δ dictate the evolution of the additional income. Thus,
we take β ∈ {0.2; 0.5; 0.8} and δ ∈ {0.6; 0.7; 0.8; 0.9}.25 Our subsequent comments usually
21This assumption permits an easy formal manipulation and ensures the comparability of the two
approaches. At the same time, it allows for sufficient flexibility with respect to the choice of the income
magnitude.
22Moreover, in this case the percentage of post-consumption wealth assigned to risky assets in equilib-
rium from Equation (29b) yields: θ = Rf/[Rf − exp(r + σ
2
r/2 − γσcr)] ≥ 1. This induces investors to
throw caution to the wind, borrowing ever more money , which is then channelled into the risky portfolio.
23Recall first that V relies on subjective perceptions and is derived on the basis of behavioral parameters
according to Equation (5). Then this connection is ensured by the interdependency of α and V from
Equations (29). It is central to our work, as we assume that all decisions rely on individual perceptions
and attempt to analyze how they change subject to different perception parameters. For δ = 1/α,
the percentage of post-consumption wealth allocated to risky assets in equilibrium from Equation (29b)
becomes independent of α, specifically θ = [Rf − exp(c+ (1− 2γ)σ
2
c/2)/[Rf − exp(r + σ
2
r/2− γσcr)].
24Note that for the purpose of comparability, we consider identical additional incomes in both settings
with expected and non-expected utility.
25We actually run simulations for all β ∈ {0.2; 0.5; 0.8; 0.98} and δ ∈
{0.2; 0.5; 0.6; 0.7; 0.8; 0.9; 2; 10; 100}. The final choice of the value-ranges mentioned in the text is
motivated by several facts and findings. First, δ > 1 entails negative values for the wealth percentages to
be consumed in the expected-utility setting. Second, the value β = 0.98, which is in line with Barberis
and Huang (2004b), yields implausible (that is negative) estimates of the same percentages in the
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account for all considered (β, δ)-combinations. Yet the results illustrated in the tables of
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 focus on the case with δ = 0.9 and consider two different values of
β = 0.2 and β = 0.8. This allows us to compare the reactions of investors who perceive one
of the two utility sources (namely the consumption for β = 0.2 and the financial wealth
fluctuations for β = 0.8) as dominant. All unreported numerical results are available upon
request.
3.2 The expected-utility approach
In order to estimate the variables of interest in our model, we start by considering the
expected-utility setting. Following Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and Barberis and
Huang (2004a), we chose three values of the parameter γ that express different degrees of
the risk aversion of the consumption utility, namely γ ∈ {0.5; 1; 1.5}. In line with the same
papers, we also account for no and moderate influence of past losses on the perception
of risky investments and set k ∈ {0; 3}. In addition, we consider different degrees of
narrow framing, specifically b0 ∈ {0.001; 100; 1, 000} for γ ≥ 1, and b0 ∈ {0.001; 5; 10} for
γ < 1.26 Finally, recall that in order to make the expected-utility setting comparable to
the non-expected utility one in Section 3.3, we consider that investors dispose of periodical
additional incomes. The magnitude of these incomes is dictated by a free-choice parameter
δ and by a behavioral parameter β that is specific to the non-expected utility setting. As
β stems from the non-expected utility framework, it has no intuitive meaning in the
present setting with expected utility. Thus, we subsequently interpret the variation of our
equilibrium estimates with respect to the changes in the additional income It (instead of
the changes in β). This is possible, as It increases (decreases) subject to higher β (δ)-
values.27 In essence, higher additional incomes are equivalent to more relaxed requirements
for financial investments.
Equation (16a) delivers an estimate of the discounting factor ρ in the aggregate equi-
librium.28 Plugging this estimate ρˆ into Equation (16b), we obtain an empirical equivalent
for the prospective value in equilibrium V¯ . We can further assess the corresponding loss
non-expected equilibrium.
26First, in light of Equation (26), b0 6= 0. Second, recall that the weighting coefficient of the utility
derived from risky investments in Equation (10) is obtained by multiplying the narrow framing parameter
b0 with the aggregate consumption C¯
−γ
t . Consequently, as mean[Ct] ≈ 46, 000 in our sample, yet the
highest b0 = 1, 000 entails for γ = 1 a still small (non-discounted) contribution of this source of utility
to the total utility, specifically of less than 2.2%. Similarly, b0 = 10 and γ = 0.5 result in a share of less
than 4.7%.
27Due to our assumption that It = Ct/(αδ) and according to α = 1− β
1
γR
1−γ
γ
f exp
(1−γ)σ2
c
2 in Equation
(29a).
28Of course, we could also fix ρ and estimate γ. However, this procedure proves to be more delicate,
given that Equation (16a) is a second-order equation in γ, such that the existence and number of real
roots depends on the sign of its determinant c2 − 2σ2c log(ρRf ). In the case with either none or two
distinct real solutions, we cannot provide an economic interpretation of the equilibrium.
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aversion coefficient λˆ according to Equation (6). In particular, the explicit expressions of
the desired variables are based on the following reformulation of the equilibrium Equations
(16):
ρ =
1
Rf
exp
(
γc−
γ2σ2c
2
)
(26a)
V¯ =
C¯γt
b0
[
1
ρ
− exp
(
−γc+ r +
γ2σ2c + σ
2
r
2
− γσcr
)]
. (26b)
Unreported results show that in the absence of narrow framing (as approximated by
the case with the lowest b0 = 0.001), the estimates of the loss aversion coefficient λ are
highly negative (positive) for yearly (quarterly) portfolio revisions, and thus implausible.
In effect, the individual attitude to losses stemming from financial investments has no
practical meaning (and is difficult to interpret in terms of our model) when investors pay
no attention to the utility derived from these investments compared to the consumption
utility. Similarly, an excessive consumption-based risk aversion γ = 1.5 results in im-
plausible estimates of both ρ (that are slightly supra-unitary) and in part of λ (that are
negative or too highly positive, with the exception of the case with b0 = 1000), as intu-
itively expected according to Equations (26). In sum, plausible parameter combinations
for reaching the aggregate market equilibrium in the expected-utility setting turn out to
be (γ = 0.5, b0 ∈ {5; 10}) and (γ = 1, b0 ∈ {100; 1000}) and they are addressed below.
Table 1 (Table 8 in Appendix 5.2) presents the estimation results for these parameter
combinations, yearly (quarterly) portfolio evaluations in our usual cases with λ = 2.25,
δ = 0.9, and β ∈ {0.2; 0.8}. Recall that the switch from β = 0.2 to β = 0.8 for a fixed
δ = 0.9 is equivalent with (hence interpreted as) an increase in additional incomes.
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β = 0.8 β = 0.2
γ = 0.5 γ = 1 γ = 0.5 γ = 1
k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3
b0 = 5
ρˆ 0.95685 0.95685 0.98208 0.98208 0.95685 0.95685 0.98208 0.98208
Vˆ -92.17895 -92.17895 -23,107.54900 -23,107.54900 -92.17895 -92.17895 -23,107.54900 -23,107.54900
λˆ 1.0853 1.0836 0.71912 0.70696 0.79627 0.99587 -2.56203 3.17835
b0 = 10
ρˆ 0.95685 0.95685 0.98208 0.98208 0.95685 0.95685 0.98208 0.98208
Vˆ -46.08948 -46.08948 -11,553.77500 -11,553.77500 -46.08948 -46.08948 -11,553.77500 -11,553.77500
λˆ 1.0867 1.0851 0.90059 0.89201 0.79024 0.99968 -0.65440 1.96148
b0 = 100
ρˆ 0.95685 0.95685 0.98208 0.98208 0.95685 0.95685 0.98208 0.98208
Vˆ -4.60895 -4.60895 -1,155.37750 -1,155.37750 -4.60895 -4.60895 -1,155.37750 -1,155.37750
λˆ 1.08792 1.08635 1.0639 1.0585 0.78480 1.00311 1.0625 0.86629
b0 = 1, 000
ρˆ 0.95685 0.95685 0.98208 0.98208 0.95685 0.95685 0.98208 0.98208
Vˆ -0.46089 -0.46089 -115.53775 -115.53775 -0.46089 -0.46089 -115.53775 -115.53775
λˆ 1.08804 1.08648 1.0802 1.0752 0.78426 1.00345 1.2341 0.75677
Table 1: The main estimated parameters in the expected-utility setting for yearly data, λ = 2.25 and δ = 0.9.
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We first address the investors’ attitude towards financial losses. One variable that
captures this attitude is the loss aversion coefficient, the equilibrium estimates of which
are denoted by λˆ. From Tables 1 and 8 we observe that for higher additional incomes
(formally corresponding to β = 0.8), λˆ takes values slightly above 1 for both yearly and
quarterly portfolio evaluations. As 1 can be considered to be the “neutral” loss-aversion
value, our representative investor appears to be rather indifferent between financial gains
and losses.
Surprisingly, lower extra-money dedicated to consumption (β = 0.2) entails a decrease
in the loss aversion coefficient in equilibrium. This variation is confirmed for further
δ-values. At first glance, this conclusion appears to be counterintuitive. Accordingly,
investors who are less sure of being able to cover current consumption needs (as their
additional incomes are lower) become more relaxed towards financial losses (although such
losses would reduce their revenues even more). One possible explanation is that agents
tend toward taking the chance of investing in financial assets, as this chance (in other words
gambling) hides not only the danger of losses, but also the promise of gains. However,
note that the loss aversion coefficient is not a one-to-one measure of investor actions
concerning wealth allocation. They represent the result of more complex phenomena.
Thus, variations of the loss aversion coefficient due to changes in the additional income
do not need to be proportionally reflected in the magnitude of the actual investment in
financial assets. For instance, Tables 3 and 10 show that the lower additional incomes
corresponding to β = 0.2 entail smaller fractions of the total wealth allocated to risky
assets (1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ. More detailed investigations referring to this issue are undertaken at
the end of this section. Finally, note also that the loss aversion coefficient might be an
imperfect measure of the attitude towards financial losses. Yet, the other two measures
LAi and gRA do not appear to evolve differently (see the findings in this respect presented
later in this section).
In general, λˆ does not reach the value of 2.25 suggested in the original prospect theory
for any of the considered parameter configurations.29 This is not very surprising, as the
latter has been mostly obtained in experiments where subjects are faced only with financial
decisions. Our results underline the fact that, when accounting for both consumption
and financial investments as generators of individual utility, investor reluctance towards
financial losses measured by the equilibrium-equivalent loss aversion coefficient λˆ is lower.
On average, λˆ is somewhat smaller when portfolios are evaluated more often. At first
glance, this appears to be at odds with the idea of myopic loss aversion. However, two
remarks can be made in this regard. First, note that the myopic loss aversion originates
in, but is not measured by, the loss aversion coefficient. A more appropriate measure is
29One of the highest values, λˆ = 1.782, is obtained for β = 0.2, δ = 0.7, k = 0, and yearly evaluations.
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the wealth fraction allocated to risky assets, the evolution of which will be subsequently
detailed.30 Second, the observed changes in λˆ are rather small, especially for incomes
corresponding to β ≥ 0.5. This points to a relative stability of the loss attitude in
equilibrium with respect to the portfolio evaluation frequency for a higher certitude of
covering current consumption needs (namely for middle-range to high additional incomes).
Moreover, for a fixed degree of narrow framing b0, the variable λˆ resulting for the
higher additional income corresponding to β = 0.8, appears to decrease when switching
from k = 0 to k = 3. Note also that the respective changes in value are very small
for quarterly portfolio evaluations although the inverse holds for λ = 2.25, β = 0.2
and γ = 0.5. This tendency is confirmed for most of the other considered parameter
combinations, where the differences become substantial for low values of both β and δ.31
However, we can conclude that when the additional income to be consumed is sufficiently
high (β ≥ 0.5), the reluctance towards past losses does not have a significant impact on
the attitude towards current losses. It is still difficult to formulate clear-cut conclusions
with respect to the variation of λˆ subject to the narrow framing coefficient b0 when k is
fixed. For the highest additional income values (β = 0.8), we notice a slight tendency to
increase (decrease) when portfolios are evaluated once a year (every three months), the
changes being yet very small.
In the same context of the investor attitude towards financial losses, it is interesting
to follow the evolution of the two other measures introduced in the theoretical section,
namely LAi in Equation (7) and gRA in Equation (8). Table 2 (Table 9 in Appendix 5.2)
presents the corresponding estimates for yearly (quarterly) portfolio evaluations and the
cases already analyzed in Table 1 (Table 8) above.
30This remark is in the same spirit as the above comments on the variation of λˆ subject to β.
31Specifically, one of the biggest differences is obtained for β = 0.2 and δ = 0.7, where λˆ decreases for
k = 3 to almost one half of the value for k = 0.
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β = 0.8 β = 0.2
γ = 0.5 γ = 1 γ = 0.5 γ = 1
k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3
b0 = 5
LAi 1.0853 1.0408 0.7191 0.6641 0.79627 0.95421 -2.562 3.1365
gRA 2,375,552.2 2,086,117.3 4,047,794.6 3,553,753.8 288,130 249,340 371,530 428,830
b0 = 10
LAi 1.0867 1.0423 0.9006 0.8491 0.79024 0.95801 -0.6544 1.9196
gRA 2,375,720.2 2,086,278.7 4,089,066.7 3,591,723.6 288,100 249,450 433,480 422,590
b0 = 100
LAi 1.0879 1.0436 1.0639 1.0157 0.7848 0.96144 1.0625 0.82444
gRA 2,375,871.4 2,086,423.9 4,126,211.6 3,625,896.5 288,080 249,540 489,230 416,970
b0 = 1, 000
LAi 1.0880 1.0437 1.0802 1.0323 0.78426 0.96178 1.2341 0.71492
gRA 2,375,886.5 2,086,438.4 4,129,926.1 3,629,313.8 288,070 249,550 494,810 416,410
Table 2: The estimated index of loss aversion (LAi) and global first-order risk aversion (gRA) in the expected-utility setting for yearly
data, λ = 2.25 and δ = 0.9.
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For the most part, the evolutions of LAi and gRA confirm the conclusions reached
so far for λˆ. That is, both measures of the attitude towards financial losses increase
for enhanced narrow framing, decrease when past losses are penalized, and also diminish
when portfolio performance is checked more often (where the changes in gRA are very
high), other things being equal.
Moreover, LAi closely follows the values of the simple loss aversion coefficient in the
market equilibrium, being somewhat (but almost always insignificantly) lower. We cannot
yet detect a clear pattern of its variation with the additional income. In this regard, gRA
behaves more consistently, as it clearly increases for higher additional incomes (specifically,
for either higher β or lower δ-values).32 Also, gRA better describes how the reluctance to
losses extends across time, as it clearly drops when k increases from zero to three. In sum,
gRA appears to better capture the changing attitude to losses in equilibrium subject to
the variation of different model parameters.
Before approaching the problem of optimal wealth allocation, we investigate the other
two variables for which estimates can be obtained in the expected-utility equilibrium.
Tables 1 and 8 contain the respective values for the usual cases with δ = 0.9 and β ∈
{0.2; 0.8}. As apparent from Equation (26a), the discounting factor ρ does not depend
on the choice of either β, or δ, or b0. Table 1 shows that for yearly portfolio evaluations
and γ = 1, ρˆ ≈ 0.98, which complies with the assumptions of Barberis, Huang, and
Santos (2001) and Barberis and Huang (2004a). As expected, lower consumption-based
risk aversion γ = 0.5 entails lower preference for immediacy and our estimate ρˆ < 0.96.
The corresponding estimates from Table 8 for quarterly portfolio revisions are somewhat
higher and less sensitive to changes in γ.
Finally, note that the estimated prospective value in equilibrium remains negative
Vˆ < 0 across all considered parameter configurations. Thus, financial investments appear
to lower the overall utility of our representative investor. The evolution of Vˆ for different
parameter combinations confirms the tendencies pointed out for λˆ. In particular, inde-
pendently of the penalty on past losses k, Vˆ increases subject to higher narrow framing
b0, as well as for more frequent portfolio evaluations, other things being equal.
In the sequel, we turn to the question of whether or not myopic loss aversion becomes
manifest in our equilibrium setting with two-dimensional expected utility. The answer
goes hand in hand with the wealth allocation in equilibrium. The subsequent comments
refer to the findings for all considered additional income configurations (or all (β, δ)-
combinations), while direct references to the values in Tables 3 and 10 are explicitly
indicated.
In this context, we compute the mean of the proportions of total wealth dedicated to
32Recall that higher gRA-values point to lower aversion to financial losses.
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consumption C¯/Wˆ and the one of the remaining wealth (after consumption) assigned to
risky assets θˆ, where the latter results from Equation (12a). They are illustrated in Table
3 (Table 10 in Appendix 5.2) for yearly (quarterly) portfolio evaluations and our standard
cases with λ = 2.25, δ = 0.9, and β ∈ {0.2; 0.8}. In essence, all variables that refer to
the wealth allocation are robust33 with respect to the sensitivity to past losses k and are
independent of the degree of narrow framing b0.
β = 0.8 β = 0.2
γ = 0.5 γ = 1 γ = 0.5 γ = 1
k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3
C¯/Wˆ 0.05576 0.05573 0.04169 0.04167 0.20578 0.20634 0.14703 0.14733
Iˆ/C¯ 3.5459 3.5459 5.5556 5.5556 1.1609 1.1609 1.3889 1.3889
θˆ 0.41549 0.41445 0.42767 0.42704 0.27721 0.27135 0.33236 0.32822
(1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ 0.39232 0.39135 0.40984 0.40925 0.22017 0.21536 0.28349 0.27986
Table 3: The estimated wealth allocation in the expected-utility setting for yearly data,
λ = 2.25 and δ = 0.9.
First, our overall results show that investors who maximize expected utility from both
consumption and financial investments and who evaluate the latter once every year (three
months) turn out to dedicate between 2 − 21% (1 − 13%) of their total wealth to con-
sumption. These percentages clearly depend on the additional income (i.e. on the chosen
values of β and δ).34 Thus, the mean values C¯/Wˆ decrease for higher additional incomes
(formally for either higher β-values or lower higher δ-s), as covering the current consump-
tion needs from financial revenues is not so stringent.35 This becomes apparent in Tables
3 and 10 for the particular case with δ = 0.9. The highest overall value is obtained for the
lowest additional income corresponding to β = 0.2 and δ = 0.9. It is indeed reasonable to
think that, when investors dispose of sufficient additional revenues, they develop a more
relaxed attitude towards financial investments, specifically they allocate more money to
these financial ventures (and proportionally less to consumption). However, the average
portions of total wealth dedicated to consumption in equilibrium C¯/Wˆ are very small.
At first glance, this appears to attest to an unexpected openness towards financial invest-
ments in general. It should however be recalled that the total wealth (the mean of which
is in equilibrium Wˆ ) includes not only financial revenues, but also the additional incomes.
As the latter is sufficient for fulfilling consumption needs, the remaining part becomes
available for being invested in financial assets. This makes the total wealth increase faster
than consumption (and even more for higher β-values), resulting in small ratios C¯/Wˆ .
33Changes are in the third or fourth decimal point.
34Note that total wealth includes the initial wealth invested in the financial markets plus the additional
income.
35In particular, all C¯/Wˆ lie under 6% (14%) when β exceeds the threshold of 0.5.
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The coverage rate of consumption from additional incomes is on average reflected by the
ratio Iˆ/C¯, the evolution of which can be observed in the same Tables 3 and 10 for δ = 0.9.
In this case, the additional income covers on average more than the consumption needs,
as Iˆ/C¯ > 1.36
Second, between 27 − 45% (2 − 17%) of the remaining wealth after consumption is
allocated to risky assets when yearly (quarterly) portfolio checks are performed. These
percentages correspond to the estimates θˆ derived across all considered parameter con-
figurations. The values of θˆ grow with the magnitude of the additional income (namely
subject to higher β or to lower δ-values).37 As stressed above, when investors have more
money at their disposal, they may also allocate higher sums to risky assets. Note that
the estimated percentages of post-consumption wealth invested in the risky portfolio are
lower than the respective values found in the one-dimensional utility setting in Rengifo
and Trifan (2006)38, where the estimates θˆ obtained for high β coupled with low δ-values
come closest. Again, the mean θˆ is not significantly different when investor penalize or
not past losses.
Finally, recall that while in the one-dimensional setting the total wealth is exclu-
sively assigned to financial investments, in the present two-dimensional setting θˆ stands
for percentages of post-consumption wealth invested in risky assets. The corresponding
percentages of total wealth assigned to risky investments can be obtained by multiplying
(1 − C¯/Wˆ ) by θˆ. Across all considered additional income values, θˆ amounts to between
approximately 22− 43% (2− 17%) for yearly (quarterly) portfolio evaluations. They are
higher for a more pronounced consumption-based risk aversion γ, for higher extra incomes
(which is equivalent to higher β and/or lower δ-values), and for more frequent portfolio
evaluations. These conclusions are illustrated for the case with δ = 0.9 in the same Ta-
bles 3 and 10. We can hence conclude that myopic loss aversion continues to manifest
when consumption is incorporated as an additional source of utility besides financial in-
vestments and when expected utility is maximized. In particular, investors remain highly
averse towards financial risks and their reluctance increases for more frequent evaluations
of the risky portfolio. In addition, the reluctance towards risky assets is more pronounced
than in the one-sided utility framework in Rengifo and Trifan (2006), and as expected,
grows as the additional income covers less of the current consumption needs.
We close this section with several remarks concerning the result replication for further
36For all considered δ < 1-values, Iˆ/C¯ lies in the interval 1.16− 8.33 for both frequencies of the risky-
performance evaluations. The respective values increase for (higher β, lower δ)-combinations, as well as
for γ = 1.
37In particular, all values lie above 34% (14%) when β crosses over the neutral value of 0.5.
38According to Table 1 in Rengifo and Trifan (2006), for cumulative cushions and normally distributed
expected returns they find that 49% (18.5%) of wealth is invested in risky assets when portfolios are
evaluated yearly (quarterly).
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values of the initial loss-aversion coefficient λ. Recall that this coefficient is employed in
order to derive VaR* from Equation (3) and the prospective value from Equation (5),
and the main analysis conducted so far relies on λ = 2.25. We run further sensitivity
tests for λ ∈ {0.5; 1; 3}, the results of which show that all evolution patterns found
above remain valid. While neither the estimated discounting factor ρˆ nor the derived
prospective value Vˆ depend on the initial loss-aversion coefficient, the equivalent λˆ varies
as expected, proportionally to λ. Moreover, the equilibrium-equivalent estimates of LAi
and gRA increase in λ, where the variations of LAi are rather minor but those of gRA
more pronounced. Naturally, the initial attitude towards losses should be proportionally
reflected in the attitude of the representative investor, required in order to reach the
aggregate equilibrium. Furthermore, the mean percentages of total wealth dedicated to
consumption in equilibrium C¯/Wˆ are rather robust with respect to the initial coefficient
of loss aversion. The percentages of post-consumption wealth invested in risky assets θˆ
slightly increase in λ, but the changes are already minor for λ ≥ 1. The same holds for
the resulting percentages of total wealth dedicated to risky investments (1−C¯/Wˆ )θˆ. This
suggests that investors who are initially more averse to financial losses and maximize two-
dimensional expected utility may exhibit slightly enhanced reluctance towards financial
investments in general, and towards risky investments in particular.
3.3 The non-expected utility approach
In order to derive parameter estimates in the equilibrium setting with non-expected utility,
we proceed analogously to Section 3.2. We again follow Barberis, Huang, and Santos
(2001) and Barberis and Huang (2004a), as well as our model restrictions in Equations
(18a) and (18b), and choose the risk aversion parameter of the consumption utility γ ∈
{0.5; 1.5}39 and the sensitivity to prior losses k ∈ {0; 3}. Given the particular form of
Equation (18a), the contribution of the risky prospect to the total utility decreases in the
narrow-framing coefficient b0 for γ > 1, such that we now take b0 ∈ {0.001; 0.01; 0.1; 0.5; 1}.
Under the assumption of periodical additional incomes of It = Ct/(αδ), the total gross
return from financial investments in Equation (21) results in:
Rtott+1 =
1
1− α
Ct+1 − αIt+1
Ct
=
1
1− α
δ − 1
δ
Ct+1
Ct
⇒ log(Rtott+1) = log(δ − 1)− log(δ)− log(1− α) + c+ σcǫt+1.
(27)
39Recall that according to Equation (18a), γ 6= 1.
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Consequently, the equilibrium Equation (23c) changes to:
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θV¯ .
(28)
Thus, for a fixed subjective weight β in the aggregator function in Equation (18a),
Equations (23a), (23b), and (28) deliver estimators for the percentages of total wealth
dedicated to consumption α, the portion of post-consumption wealth invested in risky
assets θ and the prospective value V¯ in equilibrium.40 Specifically, dividing Equations
(23b) and (28) and plugging the result into Equation (23a), we derive α and θ. Finally,
we restate Equation (23b) in order to obtain an expression for V¯ . This yields the following
expressions of the parameters that can be estimated in the equilibrium of the non-expected
utility setting:
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1
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γ
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2
)
(29a)
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1
b0Rf
[
αβ
(1− α)(1− β)
]
−
γ
1−γ
[
Rf − exp
(
r +
σ2r
2
− γσcr
)]
=
1
b0
β(1− β)
γ
1−γ exp
(
γσ2c
2
) Rf − exp
(
r +
σ2r
2
− γσcr
)
[
1− β
1
γR
1−γ
γ
f exp
(
(1− γ)σ2c
2
)] γ
1−γ
. (29c)
Note that in Equation (29b), the percentage of post-consumption wealth invested in risky
assets in equilibrium θ is inversely proportional on each additional income parameter δ and
the total-wealth percentage dedicated to consumption in equilibrium α. Then, according
to Equation (29a) and to our assumption It = Ct/(αδ), θ increases c.p. for higher weights
β, as well as for higher δ-values. Henceforth, we refer high β-values as the case where
40Again, it is possible to proceed in the opposite way: by fixing α and θ, an estimator for γ can be
derived from Equation (23a). However, the double or possible non-real roots of quadratic equations are
difficult to interpret from an economical point of view. Equation (23a) has real roots if and only if
βRf ≥ exp(−(2 log(1− α) + 2rf − σ
2
c )
2/(8σ2c )).
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investors consider the utility derived from narrowly framed financial investments more
important than the consumption utility, according to the aggregator function in Equation
(18a).41
Unreported results show that an extreme consumption-based risk aversion γ = 1.5
again yields implausible values of the equilibrium estimates Vˆ and λˆ. Consequently, our
subsequent comments focus on the case with γ = 0.5. Table 4 (Table 11 in Appendix
5.3) presents the estimates from Equations (29) for yearly (quarterly) evaluations and our
standard cases with λ = 2.25, δ = 0.9, and β ∈ {0.2; 0.8}.
β = 0.8 β = 0.2
k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3
b0 = 0.001
αˆ 0.31335 0.31335 0.95708 0.95708
θˆ -0.6726 -0.6726 -2.0563 -2.0563
Vˆ -943.98 -943.98 -309.06 -309.06
λˆ 1.0537 1.0502 0.83444 0.97344
b0 = 0.01
αˆ 0.31335 0.31335 0.95708 0.95708
θˆ -0.6726 -0.6726 -2.0563 -2.0563
Vˆ -94.398 -94.398 -30.906 -30.906
λˆ 1.0846 1.0829 0.78922 1.0005
b0 = 0.1
αˆ 0.31335 0.31335 0.95708 0.95708
θˆ -0.6726 -0.6726 -2.0563 -2.0563
Vˆ -9.4398 -9.4398 -3.0906 -3.0906
λˆ 1.0877 1.0861 0.7847 1.0032
b0 = 0.5
αˆ 0.31335 0.31335 0.95708 0.95708
θˆ -0.6726 -0.6726 -2.0563 -2.0563
Vˆ -1.888 -1.888 -0.61811 -0.61811
λˆ 1.088 1.0864 0.7843 1.0034
b0 = 1
αˆ 0.31335 0.31335 0.95708 0.95708
θˆ -0.6726 -0.6726 -2.0563 -2.0563
Vˆ -0.94398 -0.94398 -0.30906 -0.30906
λˆ 1.088 1.0865 0.78425 1.0035
Table 4: The main estimated parameters in the non-expected utility setting for yearly
data, λ = 2.25, γ = 0.5 and δ = 0.9.
We first note that similarly to the expected-utility findings, the prospective value
41Recall however that the weights of financial wealth in the (final) utility function are also influenced
by the narrow framing coefficient, as apparent from Equation (17). However, β gives a clearer and more
readily interpretable picture of how investors balance between consumption and financial utility.
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estimates Vˆ < 0 (and this across all considered parameter configurations). This reinforces
the idea that maximizers of two-dimensional utility perceive financial investments as one
that deteriorates the overall utility in the market equilibrium. However, Vˆ substantially
increases subject to the intensity of narrow framing. Naturally, investors who narrow-
frame financial investments perceive risky investments as more favorable or, equivalently,
as less destructive for the total utility.
Regarding the attitude towards financial losses, we first note that the estimates λˆ of
the loss aversion coefficient in equilibrium lie very close to the respective estimates in the
expected-utility setting.42 It is also interesting to observe that switching between (almost)
no narrow framing b0 = 0.001 to narrow framing b0 > 0.001 entails substantial variations
in λˆ. By contrast, in the presence of narrow framing b0 > 0.001 the loss aversion coefficient
does not significantly vary subject to the degree of narrow framing. This supports the
findings under expected-utility maximization that the absence of narrow framing with
respect to financial projects cannot impact the aversion towards financial losses.
Interestingly, the estimates λˆ slightly diminish for more frequent portfolio evaluations
and in the presence of narrow framing b0 > 0.001, but only as long as financial investments
are perceived as the main utility source β = 0.8. When, on the contrary, consumption
receives the highest weight in the utility aggregation as β = 0.2, this tendency is reverted.
Thus, more frequent checks of the risky-portfolio performance appear either to compensate
for or to enhance the loss aversion in equilibrium, depending on the importance that is
subjectively ascribed to financial utility relative to consumption utility.
Again, all obtained estimates λˆ lie below the originally proposed value of the loss
aversion coefficient 2.25. For yearly evaluations they are slightly higher (lower) than
the “neutral” value of 1, as β = 0.8 (β = 0.2). The highest value of λˆ is obtained for
β = 0.5, δ = 0.9, and k = 3.43 Accordingly, investors behave loss aversely in the somewhat
ambiguous situation where consumption and narrowly framed financial investments are
aggregated with equal weights as utility sources. In the rest of the cases, the aggregate
equilibrium with two-dimensional utility mostly requires that investors perceive financial
losses in a more relaxed way.
Moreover, the loss aversion coefficient in equilibrium appears to be rather stable with
respect to the penalty imposed on past losses k, especially when either risky performance
is evaluated more often or the weights β are higher. The sole substantial changes (namely
an increase) can be observed in Table 4 for β = 0.2, where the reluctance towards past
losses appears to extend to current losses as well, as k = 3 entails higher values of λˆ
compared to k = 0.
Finally, the loss aversion coefficient in equilibrium λˆ varies as expected proportionally
42Recall that we can compare the two settings for γ = 0.5 and b0 > 0.001. See Tables 1 and 8.
43Specifically, this value is λˆ = 2.1797.
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to the initial attitude to losses given by λ. This conclusion is based on the findings for the
entire range of λ ∈ {0.5; 1; 2.25; 3}). On average, the variations of the λˆ subject to λ are
small. Moreover, for quarterly portfolio evaluations the evolution of λˆ subject to β and δ
exhibits identical patterns to the original case with λ = 2.25. However, yearly portfolio
revisions entail different changes in λˆ, which grows for higher β and drops for higher δ as
λ = 0.5, diminishes c.p. for both higher β and δ as λ = 1 and varies unsystematically
for λ = 3. Accordingly, in the non-expected utility framework the evaluation frequency
affects the way in which the initial attitude towards losses extends in equilibrium.
In the sequel, we proceed analogously to Section 3.2 by deriving equilibrium values of
our two further measures of the actual investors’ attitude to financial losses from Equations
(7) and (8). The corresponding estimates for yearly (quarterly) data, and the usual cases
with γ = 0.5, λ = 2.25, δ = 0.9, and β ∈ {0.2; 0.8} are included in Table 5 (Table 12 in
Appendix 5.3).
β = 0.8 β = 0.2
k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3
b0 = 0.001
LAi 1.0537 1.0074 0.83444 0.93177
gRA 2,372,400 2,083,000 288,530 248,880
b0 = 0.01
LAi 1.0846 1.0401 0.78922 0.95881
gRA 2,375,500 2,086,100 288,120 249,490
b0 = 0.1
LAi 1.0877 1.0433 0.7847 0.96152
gRA 2,375,900 2,086,400 288,080 249,550
b0 = 0.5
LAi 1.088 1.0436 0.7843 0.96176
gRA 2,375,900 2,086,400 288,070 249,550
b0 = 1
LAi 1.088 1.0437 0.78425 0.96179
gRA 2,375,900 2,086,400 288,070 249,550
Table 5: The estimated index of loss aversion (LAi) and global first-order risk aversion
(gRA) in the expected-utility setting for yearly data, λ = 2.25, γ = 0.5 and δ = 0.9.
First, note that the changes entailed by the different parameter combinations con-
sidered here go in similar directions for both measures of the actual attitude to financial
losses LAi and gRA. Again, substantial changes in both LAi and gRA become apparent by
switching between the cases without (b0 = 0.001) and with narrow framing (b0 > 0.001).
In general and similarly to the expected-utility setting, the equilibrium estimates of
LAi closely follow the evolution of the simple coefficient of loss aversion λˆ, where the
former is somewhat smaller than the latter. LAi appears to be rather stable to the c.p.
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variations of the degree of narrow framing b0 (again as long as b0 > 0.001), and of the
penalty on past losses k. Again, the changes of LAi subject to the portfolio evaluation
frequency remain unsubstantial as long as there is not penalty imposed on past losses
and as financial investments are considered as the main source of utility b0 ≥ 0.5. By
contrast, when investors are reluctant towards past losses k = 3 and when consumption
and narrowly framed financial investments are viewed as equally important utility sources
β = 0.5, somewhat higher variations of LAi between the two revision frequencies can be
observed.
Finally, gRA develops in a direction that is intuitively to be expected for the attitude
towards financial losses (where reductions in gRA are interpreted as higher loss aversion).
In particular, it substantially drops for higher revision frequencies. It also clearly dimin-
ishes when past losses are penalized (i.e. by switching from k = 0 to k = 3), where the
variation is more pronounced for quarterly portfolio evaluations. While the c.p. variation
of LAi subject to the initial coefficient of loss aversion λ is weak and somewhat unsys-
tematical, the equilibrium-equivalent estimates of gRA increase for higher λ-values. This
confirms the results provided by the expected-utility approach, namely that gRA more
consistently reflects the investor attitude towards financial losses.
Having analyzed the investor attitude towards losses in the non-expected utility equi-
librium, we turn now to the problem of wealth allocation among consumption, risky, and
risk-free financial assets. The results obtained for the percentages of both total wealth
consumed α and post-consumption wealth invested in risky assets θ show that both these
percentages are independent of the narrow framing coefficient b0 and of the penalty on
past losses k. They are illustrated for our usual cases with λ = 2.25, γ = 0.5, δ = 0.9,
and β ∈ {0.2; 0.8}, in the same above Tables 5 and 12.
First, as is apparent from Equation (29a), the estimates αˆ do not vary with δ and
decrease for more pronounced weighting of the financial utility β, ranging from almost
96% (96%) for β = 0.2 to around 31% (35%) for β = 0.8 as portfolio performance
is yearly (quarterly) evaluated. Thus, considering fluctuations of wealth from narrowly
framed financial investments as the most important source of utility yields, higher wealth
percentages allocated to financial assets (or equivalently, lower percentages dedicated to
consumption) as expected. Moreover, αˆ grows for more frequent portfolio evaluations,
where this tendency becomes manifest with a higher intensity as financial investments are
considered as an important source of utility.44 This corresponds to what we can denote
as myopic aversion towards financial investments in general.
Second, note that θˆ < 0 for all chosen values of δ < 1.45 The explanation is provided
44Specifically, αˆ changes merely from 0.9578 to 0.9593 when switching from yearly to quarterly portfolio
revisions for β = 0.2, while the corresponding variations for β = 0.8 are from 0.31335 to 0.34879.
45This situation changes for δ > 1, as we obtain θˆ > 1. Thus, plausible values 0 < θˆ < 1 appear to
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by Equation (29b), where this denominator of the first-line expression is always negative.
In essence, this denominator expresses the trade-off between the revenues from risk-free
vs. risky investments46 and decreases as risky investments become more profitable. In
other words, the denominator of this equilibrium expression of θ reflects the profitability
of risky with respect to risk-free assets taken with contrary sign. Recall now that θ stands
for the percentages of post-consumption wealth put in risky assets, hence it is expected
to grow as risky assets become more profitable. Therefore, only the absolute values of θ
can be meaningfully interpreted, and the subsequent comments refer to |θˆ|.
As noted below Equations (29), higher β-values entail higher θˆ, hence lower |θˆ|. This
tendency is slightly counterbalanced but never dominated by an increase in δ. Also recall
that |θˆ| > 1 shows that investors borrow extra-money at the risk-free rate and invest it
in the risky portfolio, which is the case for β ≤ 0.5. Apparently, for lower coverage of
consumption from additional incomes (i.e. low β-values, see for example Tables 6 and 13),
agents make surprisingly large investments in risky assets, as they probably welcome the
higher chances of gaining more money offered by risky investments. Across all considered
(β, δ)-combinations, |θˆ| varies between 67 − 944% (68 − 1008%) for yearly (quarterly)
portfolio evaluations. Moreover, the estimates of θ taken in absolute value are generally
lower for more frequent portfolio evaluations. Note also that |θˆ| is higher compared to the
mean percentages of post-consumption wealth invested in risky assets in the expected-
utility setting.
β = 0.8 β = 0.2
k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3
Iˆ/C¯ 3.5459 3.5459 1.1609 1.1609
(1− αˆ)|θˆ| 0.46184 0.46184 0.08826 0.08826
Table 6: The estimated wealth allocation in the non-expected utility setting for yearly
data, λ = 2.25, γ = 0.5 and δ = 0.9.
Finally, as θ does not reflect how total wealth is split between risky and riskless assets,
it cannot tell us anything about the aversion to financial risks in a strict sense. Across all
considered parameter-configurations, multiplying 1− αˆ by |θˆ| amounts to around 9−78%
(9 − 77%) for yearly (quarterly) portfolio evaluations. As expected, the highest values
are obtained for maximal additional incomes (i.e. due to the fact that narrowly framed
financial investments are considered the most important utility source β = 0.8 and/or
be possible only for 1 < δ < 2. However, δ > 1 yields implausible values for other model parameters in
equilibrium. In addition, the corresponding estimates in the expected-utility setting are also implausible.
For this reason, we do not further analyze cases with δ > 1.
46The denominator is close to the the expected equity premium taken with a negative sign, namely
−(Et(Rt+1)− Rf ) ≃ Rf − exp(r + σ
2
r/2). Specifically, the risky returns are amended according to their
correlation to consumption.
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that δ is minimal). For β = 0.8, over 46% (44%) of the total wealth is dedicated to risky
assets in equilibrium when portfolios are evaluated once a year (every three months). For
β = 0.2, the respective percentages are very similar for both revision frequencies and lie
below 9%. These results are captured in Tables 6 and 13 for δ = 0.9. Thus, we can
observe merely small changes in the percentages of total wealth invested in risky assets,
as investors evaluate their portfolios more frequently. These changes are more evident
for higher values of β. Based on this, we conclude that myopic loss aversion continues
to hold in the two-dimensional utility setting with non-expected utility, but only as long
as investors consider the utility derived form financial wealth fluctuations sufficiently
important relative to the consumption utility. Even in this case, the myopic loss aversion
holds in a softer form, as investors who evaluate their risky portfolios more often invest
only slightly lower proportions of their total wealth in risky assets. Thus, maximizing non-
expected utility appears to require in equilibrium a more relaxed attitude towards risky
investments compared to the situation when expected utility is maximized. Moreover,
relative to the findings in Rengifo and Trifan (2006) where financial investments are the
sole source of utility, investors who maximize two-dimensional utility are more (less) open
to risky investments, depending on whether narrowly framed financial investments are
perceived as the most (least) important utility source.47
As a final remark, we note that both equilibrium percentages of total wealth dedicated
to consumption αˆ and of post-consumption wealth invested in risky assets θˆ are insensitive
to the choice of the initial λ. Consequently, the same holds for the percentages of total
wealth dedicated to risky assets (1− αˆ)|θˆ|.
3.4 A summary comparison of the two approaches: expected
and non-expected utility
We note that comparing the two considered settings with expected and non-expected
utility is not an easy task. In spite of the “preventive measures” adopted in order to
ensure the possibility of performing such comparisons (namely concerning the additional
income and the values of the behavioral parameters), they employ distinct estimation
procedures and hence deliver different parameter estimates. The former setting offers the
additional advantage of being less complex and more intuitive, while the latter one allows
us to directly estimate more variables of interest, especially those regarding the optimal
wealth allocation. In spite of the claim in Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2003) that
non-expected utility better describes decision making under risk, it is difficult to reach
47In essence, the percentages of total wealth invested in risky assets in the one- and two-dimensional
utility settings lie closest to each other for the somewhat ambiguous situation with β = 0.5 and middle-
range δ-s, in sum for middle-range additional incomes.
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a clear-cut conclusion about the adequacy of one or another of the settings developed in
the present work, as they provide both common and specific results.
We start by noting the most important results that are similar under both approaches.
First, excessively high values of the consumption-related risk aversion coefficient γ are in-
compatible with the idea of aggregate equilibrium under both approaches. Also, the lack
of narrow framing of financial investments does not corroborate with the manifestation
of an attitude towards financial investments (in particular towards losses) and effectively
entails less plausible parameter estimates. Second, the aggregate markets where the repre-
sentative investor maximizes expected and non-expected utility require similar attitudes
towards financial losses. In particular, the loss aversion coefficient in equilibrium λˆ as
well as the other two measures of this attitude LAi and gRA reach values that are very
close to each other and exhibit similar evolutions subject to the variation of behavioral
model parameters in both settings. The sole difference refers to the variation of λˆ subject
to the revision frequency that appears to be dictated in the non-expected utility setting
by the importance ascribed to financial relative to consumption utility. Also, under both
approaches LAi closely follows λˆ and gRA appears to offer a more intuitive support of
how the attitude towards losses changes.
On the other hand, maximizing expected and non-expected utility entail different re-
sults with respect to the wealth allocation among consumption, risky, and risk-free finan-
cial assets. This can in part be due to the above mentioned discrepancies in methodology.
Specifically, in the expected-utility setting this wealth allocation can only be assessed on
average, on the basis of the equilibrium estimates of other variables. By contrast, the non-
expected utility approach prescribes exact values of the allocation variables in the market
equilibrium. In particular, our empirical results show that investors who maximize non-
expected utility appear to be substantially more reluctant towards financial investments
in general, but more open towards investing in risky assets. The respective fractions of
total wealth to be consumed in the aggregate equilibrium attain more plausible (namely
higher) values than under the expected-utility approach. The variation of the total-wealth
percentages invested in risky assets is more pronounced and their overall values higher.
Moreover, myopic loss aversion clearly holds under expected-utility maximization. Yet, it
becomes manifest in the non-expected utility framework only when investors consider the
financial utility sufficiently important relative to the consumption utility. Even in this
case, the wealth percentages dedicated to risky assets decrease only slightly for higher
evaluation frequencies. Finally, investors with an additional source of utility appear to
behave differently when maximizing expected utility or non-expected utility, with respect
to their peers who derive utility exclusively from financial investments. Thus, while max-
imizing expected two-dimensional utility renders them more circumspect towards risky
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investments, maximizing non-expected two-dimensional utility yields the same only when
consumption utility is considered more important than financial one. Otherwise, investors
put substantially more money in risky assets relative to the one-sided utility approach.
4 Summary and conclusions
This paper extends the model in Rengifo and Trifan (2006) by analyzing loss attitude
and wealth allocation in a two-dimensional utility framework. Specifically, one question
we attempt to answer is how non-professional investors who derive utility from both con-
sumption and (narrowly framed) financial investments behave when faced with financial
risk. A related problem we tackle refers to how these investors consequently split their
money between consumption, and risky vs. risk-free financial assets.
Following Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2003) and Barberis and Huang (2004a,b), we
consider two different ways of estimating prospective utility, namely either as expected or
as non-expected utility. In both situations, we explicitly account for the narrow framing of
financial investments, as well as for the impact of past performance on current perceptions.
In this broader setting, we derive the necessary conditions for equilibrium in the aggregate
market with a representative investor. Fixing general market parameters (such as the
dynamics of consumption and of the expected returns), and several behavioral parameters
specific to our model (such as the degree of narrow framing and the risk aversion to
consumption), these conditions provide a basis for the derivation of the prospective value
ascribed to risky investments in equilibrium. An equivalent loss aversion coefficient can
then be estimated from the definition of this prospective value. In addition, the expected-
utility setting allows for the estimation of the coefficient by which utility is discounted in
time. The byproducts of the estimation procedure in the non-expected utility setting are
the percentages of total wealth allocated to consumption and of post-consumption wealth
invested in risky assets.
The theoretical results are subsequently tested and extended in an empirical context.
We assess the equilibrium values and investigate the sensitivity of the variables of inter-
est for various configurations of the behavioral parameters and for two distinct portfolio
evaluation horizons (one year and three months). In order to avoid the impossibility of
covering current consumption needs from financial revenues throughout the entire invest-
ing period, we also consider that investors periodically dispose of exogenous additional
incomes. These incomes are shaped in order to ensure the equivalency of the two settings
with expected and non-expected utility. We also analyze the variation of the equilibrium
estimates with respect to changes in the magnitude of additional incomes.
The common and specific empirical findings under the two approaches with expected
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and non-expected utility can be summarized as follows. First, in both settings we can
isolate equilibrium-incompatible parameter constellations. One the one hand, they are
characterized by too high values of the consumption-related risk aversion coefficient. On
the other hand, the lack of narrow framing entails implausible estimates in the expected-
utility setting and unusual ones (relative to the values obtained for the remaining cases) in
the non-expected utility framework. These cases are then discarded from the subsequent
analysis.
Second, the loss aversion coefficients are very close to each other and also close to the
“loss-neutral” value of 1 in both expected- and non-expected utility settings. Specifically,
they lie slightly above (below) 1 for yearly (quarterly) portfolio evaluations. Thus, the
coefficient of loss aversion required in order to attain the market equilibrium is clearly lower
than 2.25, the value suggested by the original prospect theory. This indicates that the
aversion towards financial losses is less pronounced when consumption is considered as an
additional source of utility besides financial wealth fluctuations. Other things being equal,
the loss aversion coefficients required to attain the aggregate equilibrium in both settings
grow subject to higher degrees of narrow framing and drop when investors penalize past
losses. Yet, in the expected-utility setting the same coefficient of loss aversion diminishes
for more frequent risky performance checks. By contrast, under non-expected utility the
corresponding variation is dictated by the importance ascribed to financial utility relative
to consumption utility (specifically, for a higher importance we can observe the same
reduction in the loss aversion coefficient for more frequent evaluations).
Furthermore, the other two measures of the investor attitude towards financial losses
employed evolve in equilibrium similarly to the estimated loss aversion coefficients. The
loss aversion index follows closely the simple loss aversion coefficient, being slightly lower.
The global first-order risk aversion appears to describe more consistently and more intu-
itively the actual attitude towards financial losses and its variations subject to changes in
the behavioral model parameters.
Third, the prospective value in equilibrium is always negative, suggesting that the
overall utility diminishes with financial investments. This decrease in utility substantially
shrinks as investors pay more attention to financial investments (i.e. by more intense
narrow framing), as this attention is coupled with a positive image of the opportunities
they might offer.
Fourth, the allocation of wealth between consumption and (risky and riskless) financial
assets can be explicitly determined in the non-expected utility setting, where the equi-
librium equations deliver the necessary estimates. Under the maximization of expected
utility, this optimal allocation can only be assessed on average.
In the expected-utility framework, investors appear to allocate modest percentages
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of their total wealth to consumption, which also vary in high extent with the additional
income meant to cover current consumption needs. The respective values amount to be-
tween 2 − 21% (1 − 13%) for yearly (quarterly) portfolio evaluations, where the highest
ones are obtained for minimal additional incomes. These small values should be under-
stood in terms of our assumption that the total wealth includes the additional incomes,
which implies that it increases faster than the consumption subject to higher additional
incomes. By contrast, attaining the aggregate equilibrium when investors maximize non-
expected utility requires substantial allocations for consumption purposes. The respective
percentages yield 31−96% (35−96%) for yearly (quarterly) performance checks and vary
much less subject to the portfolio evaluation frequency. In neither of the two settings
does the fractions of total wealth dedicated to consumption vary either with the degree
of narrow framing or with the penalties imposed on past losses.
Moreover, in the expected-utility setting the percentages of post-consumption wealth
invested in risky assets increase as the additional income covers more than current con-
sumption needs (specifically, as it provides extra money to be invested in financial assets
after accounting for consumption). The respective overall values lie around 27 − 45%
(2− 17%) for yearly (quarterly) portfolio evaluations. The non-expected equilibrium de-
livers corresponding estimates that have to be interpreted in absolute value. For lower
additional incomes, investors become very interested in risky assets, as they even borrow
extra money for the purpose of increasing the risky investment. The minimal proportions
of post-consumption wealth in the non-expected utility equilibrium lie above 67% (68%)
for yearly (quarterly) portfolio evaluations and often exceed 100%. In both settings, the
fractions of post-consumption wealth invested in risky assets are invariable with respect
to the degree of narrow framing, but they slightly diminish when past losses are penalized
in the expected-utility framework.
Finally, the resulting percentages of total wealth put in risky assets yield 22 − 43%
(2−17%) when expected utility is maximized and portfolio performance is evaluated yearly
(quarterly). These values remain below the values obtained in the one-dimensional utility
framework of Rengifo and Trifan (2006). The respective percentages in the non-expected
equilibrium vary much more subject to the magnitude of the additional income, but appear
to be less influenced by the changes in the evaluation frequency. Specifically, between
9− 78% (9− 77%) of total wealth is invested in risky assets by investors maximizing non-
expected utility. These values are hence higher (lower) than the average percentages which
result when investors derive utility merely from financial investments, as the additional
utility source, i.e. the consumption, becomes less (more) important.
In sum, these numbers support the idea that investors who check the performance
of their portfolios more frequently invest less money in risky assets. Thus, myopic loss
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aversion continues to manifest when utility has twofold sources, albeit in a much softer
form and merely for sufficiently high additional incomes when non-expected utility is
maximized.
Fifth, our estimates appear to vary slightly and, as anticipated, proportionally with
the initial loss aversion coefficient. The sole exception is obtained under the non-expected
utility approach, where the loss aversion coefficient in equilibrium differently fluctuates
subject to the initial loss aversion, depending on the magnitude of the the additional
income. However, the corresponding variations remain low on average.
Concerning the expected-utility setting, the estimated discounting factor is found to
lie close to the values proposed in the literature. Furthermore, it does not vary with the
degree of narrow framing or the additional income, and is higher and less sensitive to
changes in the consumption-based risk-aversion when portfolios are evaluated more often.
In sum, maximizing expected and non-expected utility when financial investments are
narrowly framed reaches similar equilibrium results concerning the attitude to financial
losses. By contrast, the two settings offer different pictures concerning the wealth allo-
cation between consumption and risky and riskless assets in equilibrium. In particular,
investors maximizing expected-utility appear to dedicate on average surprisingly small
amounts of money to consumption and to behave on average myopically loss averse with
respect to risky investments. The non-expected approach sets clear-cut target values for
the wealth percentages to be consumed and invested in risky assets in order to reach
the aggregate equilibrium. Specifically, both these percentages are substantially higher,
but also less variable in the evaluation frequency than in the expected-utility setting.
Consequently, under the non-expected utility approach, the aversion towards financial
investments in general is more pronounced, but the attitude towards risky investments in
particular is more relaxed, and myopic loss aversion holds merely in soft form and only
when the financial wealth fluctuations are viewed as the major utility source.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Descriptive statistics
SP500 10-year bond Consumption
Evaluation frequency
Quarterly Yearly Quarterly Yearly Quarterly Yearly
Mean 0.017 0.066 0.017 0.073 0.016 0.052
Median 0.018 0.071 0.017 0.070 0.001 0.049
Std.Dev. 0.079 0.136 0.006 0.026 0.008 0.022
Kurtosis 2.661 -0.9659 0.623 0.974 0.673 -1.084
Skewness -0.671 -0.205 0.951 1.042 -0.018 0.165
Max. 0.290 0.345 0.036 0.142 0.042 0.090
Min. -0.302 -0.207 0.009 0.037 -0.010 0.011
Obs. 175 43 175 43 175 43
Table 7: Log-differences of the SP500 index and of the ten-year bond returns for
quarterly and yearly portfolio evaluations.
5.2 The expected-utility approach
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β = 0.8 β = 0.2
γ = 0.5 γ = 1 γ = 0.5 γ = 1
k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3
b0 = 5
ρˆ 0.99059 0.99059 0.99842 0.99842 0.99059 0.99059 0.99842 0.99842
Vˆ -45.961 -45.961 -6,162.7 -6,162.7 -45.96085 -45.96085 -6,162.69240 -6,162.69240
λˆ 1.0104 1.0085 2.3751 2.3772 0.99221 0.99021 1.54749 1.54707
b0 = 10
ρˆ 0.99059 0.99059 0.99842 0.99842 0.99059 0.99059 0.99842 0.99842
Vˆ -22.98 -22.98 -3,081.3 -3,081.3 -22.98042 -22.98042 -3,081.34620 -3,081.34620
λˆ 1.0033 1.0014 1.6863 1.6863 0.99085 0.98883 1.26964 1.26840
b0 = 100
ρˆ 0.99059 0.99059 0.99842 0.99842 0.99059 0.99059 0.99842 0.99842
Vˆ -2.298 -2.298 -308.13 -308.13 -2.29804 -2.29804 -308.13462 -308.13462
λˆ 0.99698 0.99505 1.0663 1.0646 0.98962 0.98758 1.0196 1.0176
b0 = 1, 000
ρˆ 0.99059 0.99059 0.99842 0.99842 0.99059 0.99059 0.99842 0.99842
Vˆ -0.2298 -0.2298 -30.813 -30.813 -0.22980 -0.22980 -30.81346 -30.81346
λˆ 0.99634 0.99441 1.0043 1.0024 0.98950 0.98746 0.99458 0.99252
Table 8: The main estimated parameters in the expected-utility setting for quarterly data, λ = 2.25 and δ = 0.9.
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β = 0.8 β = 0.2
γ = 0.5 γ = 1 γ = 0.5 γ = 1
k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3
b0 = 5
LAi 1.0104 0.9908 2.3751 2.3595 0.99221 0.95704 1.5475 1.5294
gRA 529,650 321,640 1,079,100 652,240 48,493 28,205 92,229 51,205
b0 = 10
LAi 1.0033 0.98374 1.6863 1.6687 0.99085 0.95566 1.2696 1.2507
gRA 529,700 321,690 1,085,700 658,520 48,528 28,238 97,764 56,429
b0 = 100
LAi 0.99698 0.97738 1.0663 1.0469 0.98962 0.95441 1.0196 0.99993
gRA 529,740 321,730 1,091,600 664,180 48,560 28,268 102,750 61,130
b0 = 1, 000
LAi 0.99634 0.97674 1.0043 0.98471 0.9895 0.95429 0.99458 0.97485
gRA 529,740 321,740 1,092,200 664,740 48,563 28,272 103,240 61,600
Table 9: The estimated index of loss aversion (LAi) and global first-order risk aversion (gRA) in the expected-utility setting for quarterly
data, λ = 2.25 and δ = 0.9.
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β = 0.8 β = 0.2
γ = 0.5 γ = 1 γ = 0.5 γ = 1
k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3
C¯/Wˆ 0.01866 0.01866 0.00975 0.00975 0.12545 0.12537 0.07108 0.07105
Iˆ/C¯ 3.1856 3.1856 5.5556 5.5556 1.1583 1.1583 1.3889 1.3889
θˆ 0.15451 0.14439 0.1633 0.15316 0.03233 0.02182 0.09719 0.08692
(1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ 0.15163 0.14170 0.16171 0.15167 0.02827 0.01908 0.09028 0.08074
Table 10: The estimated wealth allocation in the expected-utility setting for yearly data,
λ = 2.25 and δ = 0.9.
5.3 The non-expected utility approach
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β = 0.8 β = 0.2
k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3
b0 = 0.001
αˆ 0.34879 0.34879 0.9593 0.9593
θˆ -0.6799 -0.6799 -2.1644 -2.1644
Vˆ -803.47 -803.47 -292.13 -292.13
λˆ 1.3553 1.3538 1.0335 1.0315
b0 = 0.01
αˆ 0.34879 0.34879 0.9593 0.9593
θˆ -0.6799 -0.6799 -2.1644 -2.1644
Vˆ -80.347 -80.347 -29.213 -29.213
λˆ 1.0322 1.0303 0.99389 0.99185
b0 = 0.1
αˆ 0.34879 0.34879 0.9593 0.9593
θˆ -0.6799 -0.6799 -2.1644 -2.1644
Vˆ -8.0347 -8.0347 -2.9213 -2.9213
λˆ 0.99699 0.99506 0.98992 0.98788
b0 = 0.5
αˆ 0.34879 0.34879 0.9593 0.9593
θˆ -0.6799 -0.6799 -2.1644 -2.1644
Vˆ -1.6069 -1.6069 -0.58427 -0.58427
λˆ 1.0008 0.99928 0.98957 0.98753
b0 = 1
αˆ 0.34879 0.34879 0.9593 0.9593
θˆ -0.6799 -0.6799 -2.1644 -2.1644
Vˆ -0.80347 -0.80347 -0.29213 -0.29213
λˆ 0.99663 0.9947 0.98953 0.98749
Table 11: The main estimated parameters in the non-expected utility setting for
quarterly data, λ = 2.25, γ = 0.5 and δ = 0.9.
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β = 0.8 β = 0.2
k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3
b0 = 0.001
LAi 1.3553 1.3361 1.0335 0.9983
gRA 528,060 320,079 48,151 27,871
b0 = 0.01
LAi 1.0322 1.0126 0.99389 0.95868
gRA 529,580 321,570 48,522 28,232
b0 = 0.1
LAi 0.99986 0.98027 0.98992 0.95472
gRA 529,730 321,720 48,559 28,268
b0 = 0.5
LAi 0.99699 0.97739 0.98957 0.95436
gRA 529,740 321,730 48,562 28,271
b0 = 1
LAi 0.99663 0.97703 0.98953 0.95432
gRA 529,740 321,730 48,563 28,271
Table 12: The estimated index of loss aversion (LAi) and global first-order risk aversion
(gRA) in the expected-utility setting for quarterly data, λ = 2.25, γ = 0.5 and δ = 0.9.
β = 0.8 β = 0.2
k = 0 k = 3 k = 0 k = 3
Iˆ/C¯ 3.1856 3.1856 1.1583 1.1583
(1− αˆ)|θˆ| 0.44276 0.44276 0.08809 0.08809
Table 13: The estimated wealth allocation in the non-expected utility setting for yearly
data, λ = 2.25, γ = 0.5 and δ = 0.9.
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